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Summary
It is staggering that the government has given over £40 million to Kids Company over 
the past 13 years and still has no idea what it was getting for taxpayers’ money. It was 
not part of this inquiry to assess the outcomes of Kids Company’s work. We object to 
the obvious unfairness of central government directly funding a charity which operated 
in only two London boroughs for most of its existence, with around £4 million a year, 
at the expense of other charities and young people across the country. Despite repeated 
warnings and concerns about Kids Company’s financial situation and the impact it 
was achieving, funding to the charity continued and was never seriously questioned, 
let alone stopped. Instead responsibilities were passed between departments like a hot 
potato. All the warning signs of a failed and expensive experiment had long been there 
but it was not until June 2015 that officials finally stood up to ministers, said enough was 
enough, and sought ministerial direction before providing more money. By then it was 
too late. Kids Company was a favourite of successive ministers but Accounting Officers 
have to make decisions, sometimes under pressure, to safeguard taxpayers’ money: in 
funding Kids Company for so long they have not served taxpayers or children across 
the country well.
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Introduction
Kids Company was set up in 1996 to enhance the emotional health of young people 
through counselling, support and art therapy; and to help schools, and other educational 
institutions address the emotional needs of young people. Kids Company has received 
significant funding from the public purse - at least £42 million since 1996 from central 
government departments; and at least £4 million from local authorities and lottery bodies. 
The Department for Education oversaw grant funding for Kids Company until 2013, when 
the Cabinet Office took on the responsibility. After March 2013 government funding 
was through non-competitive, direct grant awards as Kids Company no longer met the 
criteria and quality standards for competitive grant funding schemes. In June 2015, the 
Cabinet Office advised ministers that a further grant to Kids Company would not be 
value for money. Despite this, ministers directed officials to pay £3 million, to support the 
restructuring of the charity and secure its long term sustainability. The final £3 million 
was on top of an earlier grant of £4.3 million for 2015-16, which the Cabinet Office had 
already paid, in full, in April 2015. Payment was made just a week before Kids Company 
closed on 5 August. Kids Company was given £7.3 million within a period of 16 weeks. 
Kids Company has so far passed 1,900 case files to local authorities and the Cabinet Office 
has given £200,000 to the authorities to support the transition of young people to other 
services.
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Conclusions 
1. By treating Kids Company as a special case the government missed opportunities 
to help other children. The C&AG’s report shows that Kids Company regularly 
received significant sums of money from central government, far in excess of grants 
paid to other charities. Charities and young people across the country are likely to 
have lost out because of the special attention Kids Company received from successive 
governments. Kids Company only worked with children in two London boroughs 
and Bristol yet received around £4 million a year from central government. In 2011 
Kids Company received a grant of £9 million over 2 years from the Department 
for Education, while national charities received far less from the same funding 
round (for example, Barnardo’s received £4.2 million for the same period). From 
2013, Kids Company no longer had to compete for government funding. Although 
Kids Company was not the only organisation the Department funds in this way, 
the others – such as ChildLine, which receives £2 million a year – are national 
organisations. Government repeatedly made grants to Kids Company to secure its 
longer term sustainability and to reduce its dependence on government grants, but 
this never happened and instead the government gave more and more to the charity 
at the expense of others. Kids Company also received support from other parts 
of government. The Department for Education and the Department for Work & 
Pensions seconded staff to Kids Company and HM Revenue & Customs even wrote 
off its tax bills. 
2. There was insufficient scrutiny of what Kids Company was delivering for 
taxpayers’ money. Until 2013 the government relied heavily on Kids Company’s 
own assessments of its performance. The Department for Education considered that 
very few people doubted the quality of Kids Company’s achievements and that the 
charity’s highly innovative work with extremely vulnerable people did provide value 
for money. But we are very sceptical on the charity’s inflated claims about what 
it achieved. The metrics government used to assess Kids Company’s performance 
were severely ill-judged and the Department seems to have taken Kids Company’s 
claims at face value. When the Cabinet Office took over responsibility for the grant 
to Kids Company in 2013, one of its key concerns was that the charity was not good 
at, or interested in, measuring its outcomes and the real world impact on children. 
The Cabinet Office for the first time made efforts to introduce a greater focus on 
assessing outcomes from the charity. Yet by the time the charity closed, 13 years 
after the first funding from central government, it still had no proper means for 
measuring its impact. 
3. Government ignored Kids Company’s serious cashflow problems and failure to 
make itself financially sustainable and continued to fund the charity to keep it 
afloat. The government’s external reviews of Kids Company found that it had an 
appropriate governance system, but also that it had a serious cash flow problem. In 
2014, for example, a review found that the charity had no reserves and could go bust 
at any time. The Department for Education conceded that it should have examined 
the charity’s financial position more closely before 2013 given on-going concerns. As 
long ago as 2005, a senior manager at the charity had raised concerns to Department 
but these were not dealt with in the way they should have been. In April 2015, in an 
ill-judged and gullible move, the Cabinet Office paid its whole £4.3 million grant 
6  The Government’s funding of Kids Company  
to Kids Company in one go, rather than quarterly as had previously been the case, 
because the charity showed a “willingness to make plans”, including looking at how 
it could reduce costs. The then Cabinet Office Accounting Officer acknowledged 
that this “now looks like a naive thing for me to have done”, especially when it 
emerged that the numbers the Cabinet Office had based the £4.3 million grant on 
were not accurate at the time the grant was made. Kids Company returned to seek 
more emergency funding from the Cabinet Office just 2 months later. As the charity 
had not met some of its grant conditions, the Cabinet Office refused this request. 
When the charity developed more specific plans for restructuring, the Cabinet 
Office still believed it should not receive more money as they were not convinced, 
from previous experience, that the restructure would happen. However, ministers 
considered the charity was worth one last chance: in the words of the Accounting 
Officer, ministers “took the view that it was a punt that was worth funding”1 and 
directed the Accounting Officer to make the £3 million grant payment in July 2015. 
Six days after receiving the money Kids Company closed down.
4. Accounting Officers across government failed to stand up to ministers. Although 
in some circumstances ministers can decide which charities they wish to support 
and how to fund them, it is always the job of Accounting Officers to determine 
whether the support provided represents value for money for the taxpayer. Yet for 
many years Accounting Officers did not challenge whether decisions to fund Kids 
Company represented good value for money, and therefore did not seek a direction 
from ministers. The Department for Education told us that up to 2013, as Kids 
Company had won competitive bids for schemes and delivered the outputs required, 
the question of seeking a ministerial direction had not arisen. When the charity 
failed to win funding through a competitive process in 2013, the Department for 
Education presented a “public interest case” for ministers on whether to fund Kids 
Company via a direct government grant rather than through competition. This case 
did not include an assessment of value for money. It was not until June 2015, that the 
Cabinet Office finally advised ministers that a £3 million grant to Kids Company 
was not value for money and sought a ministerial direction. The Cabinet Office had 
also considered a ministerial direction when making the payment of £4.3 million 
in April 2015, but decided it was not necessary. We look forward to examining the 
relationship between Accounting Officers and Ministers when we take evidence on 
a forthcoming National Audit Office report on accountability for taxpayers’ money.
5. Funding decisions were not based on evidence nor did they follow due process. 
Kids Company lobbied government for funding over many years. Ministers of 
successive governments had made clear their support for Kids Company and it is 
a matter of public record that there were a number of letters to successive Prime 
Ministers. Although ministers asked officials to consider options for funding Kids 
Company, Accounting Officers claimed that they were under no pressure from 
ministers to make direct grants to the charity without a competitive process. We 
find this barely plausible. With hindsight Accounting Officers considered that more 
caution should have been exercised in using powers to make uncompeted grants or 
in making commitments to fund charities, and that “evidence first, decision second” 
would have been the better way round. Indeed it would. In the case of Kids Company 
1 Q55
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decisions were made to fund the charity and then departments had to develop ways 
of making the funding available including whip-rounds across government. 
6. It is particularly alarming that the Department carried on handing over money 
for years despite there never being a model that could be replicated across the 
country. Developing innovative practice to help vulnerable groups is important but 
needs to be tightly monitored, fair and transparent. We support government funding 
of innovative and new practices to help vulnerable young people. However, Kids 
Company was a 13 year experiment which cost the government £42 million and we 
saw no evidence that children outside London and, at the end, Bristol had benefited 
from the government’s investment. We were concerned that Kids Company did not 
develop techniques that could be picked up by other organisations, when replication 
of its services was a condition of its funding. We do not believe that would have 
happened in a non-London-based charity. Children in other parts of the country 
had just as difficult needs as those supported by Kids Company, but no attempt was 
made to fund them in the same way.
7. The government failed to learn lessons from Kids Company until the end. 
Many government departments had a relationship with Kids Company but there 
appears to have been no knowledge-sharing about the charity across government, 
for example when the Department for Education transferred responsibility for the 
charity to the Cabinet Office. The government also failed to act on intelligence from 
local authorities; we were disappointed to find that departments had not formally 
spoken to local authorities to find out how Kids Company was operating on the 
ground or why local authorities had generally opted not to fund the charity. While 
government gave £42 million to Kids Company, local authorities gave just £2 million 
over the same period. In Bristol, Kids Company had failed to achieve registered 
provider status, and so the Council had terminated its contract. The Cabinet Office 
took responsibility for Kids Company’s funding in July 2013 and adopted a more 
systematic approach to overseeing the charity. But the concerns identified and raised 
by the Cabinet Office in 2015 were not new and, in any case, this was too little too 
late. For the Cabinet Office a lesson learned was that the government would not 
fund a charity like Kids Company now unless it was solvent, at arm’s length from 
Government, and sustainable without hand-to-mouth Government funding.
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Recommendations
8. As the government recognises, there are lessons to be learned from its funding of 
Kids Company. This situation must never occur again. To address these lessons we 
make the following recommendations:
i) The government should undertake a fundamental review of how it makes direct 
and non-competitive grants to the voluntary sector. The review should consider 
how:
• it ensures grant making processes are fair and equitable, for example, to 
properly assess geography and relative funding, so that no organisations are 
disadvantaged;
• it assesses the financial sustainability of a charity once the grant period finishes 
(and not just on the financial data included in the grant application); and
• when funding a charity that provides innovative services which have the 
potential to be replicated, it sets clear conditions for how and when this needs 
to happen; 
• When a national charity is providing services with predominantly local 
characteristics, advice should be sought from local bodies working in that area 
to validate value for money.
ii) The government should develop a register of grants to the voluntary sector so that 
it can: 
• easily identify charities receiving large amounts of government funding from 
single or multiple sources; and 
• share intelligence on charities’ past performance.
iii) The government should improve the way it monitors and evaluates the performance 
of grant-funded organisations including looking at the balance between self-
reporting and external evaluation. It should ensure that organisations have robust 
and transparent mechanisms in place for measuring their own performance.
iv) The government should not provide or appear to provide funding commitments 
without referring the funding request to the appropriate funding department so 
that the requirements of HM Treasury’s manual Managing Public Money2 are met.
v) If the government decides to use special powers to grant funding, it should provide 
a transparent case for its decision and report regularly on the use of these powers.
2 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/454191/Managing_Public_Money_
AA_v2_-jan15.pdf 
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1 Government’s funding of Kids 
Company
1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence 
from Chris Wormald, Permanent Secretary at the Department for Education, and from 
Richard Heaton, Permanent Secretary at the Cabinet Office until July 2015, on the 
government’s funding of Kids Company.3 
2. Kids Company was set up in 1996 and became a registered charity in 1998. It was set 
up to enhance the emotional health of young people through counselling, support and art 
therapy; and to help schools, and other educational institutions, address the emotional 
needs of young people.4
3. Kids Company has received significant funding from the public purse - at least £42 
million since 1996 from central government departments; and at least £4 million from 
local authorities and lottery bodies. In 2013, Kids Company’s annual income was £23 
million, of which 20% came from central government grants, 3% from local government 
and the remainder from private donations. The Department for Education oversaw grant 
funding for Kids Company until 2013, when the Cabinet Office took on the responsibility. 
After March 2013 government funding was through non-competitive, direct grant awards 
as Kids Company no longer met the criteria for competitive grant funding schemes.5 
4. In June 2015, the Cabinet Office advised ministers that a further grant to Kids 
Company would not be value for money. Despite this, ministers directed officials to pay £3 
million, to support the restructuring of the charity and secure its long term sustainability. 
The payment was made just 6 days before Kids Company closed down and was on top of 
an earlier grant of £4.3 million, which the Cabinet Office had paid in April 2015. Since 
closing Kids Company has passed 1,900 case files to local authorities and the Cabinet 
Office has given £200,000 to the authorities to support the transition of young people 
from Kids Company to other services.6 
5. At the start of our evidence session we asked whether Kids Company had received 
special treatment from government departments. The Accounting Officer for the 
Department for Education replied “No, I don’t think it did”. The Cabinet Office’s then 
Accounting Officer commented that “It is entirely proper for Ministers to decide which 
charities in which sectors they wish to support”. Concerning the job of officials to then 
ensure that any such support was within the requirements of Managing Public Money, 
and implemented in a way that delivered value for the taxpayer, he told us “there was no 
special treatment at all”.7 He also described Kids Company as “a controversial charity” 
with “an unusual funding situation” and told us that it was no secret that Kids Company 
was a favourite charity of ministers and prime ministers.8 When pressed on the ‘special 
treatment’ question at the end of our evidence session, the Accounting Officer at the 
Department for Education commented that Ministers of successive governments had 
made clear their support for Kids Company. In terms of whether officials broke any rules 
3 C&AG’s Report, Investigation: the government’s funding of Kids Company, Session 2015-16, HC 556, 29 October 2015
4 C&AG’s Report, paras 1.1, Figure 2
5 C&AG’s Report, Figure 1. Paras 7, 9, 10, 4.1-4.4, 4.15
6 C&AG’s Report,  paras 11, 15, Figure 2
7 Q 1
8 Qq 30, 98
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or whether there had been anything improper, he stood by his initial answer that there 
was no special treatment. He added that “If you want to define special treatment as “Were 
people taking a special interest?” then clearly they were”.9
6. The charity received national funding despite only effectively operating, for most of 
its life, within two London boroughs.10 We were concerned whether it was fair to fund a 
local charity, for such a long period, with such significant amounts that could otherwise 
have been offered to charities or organisations elsewhere in the country.11 The Cabinet 
Office’s then Accounting Officer told us that if the charity had been able to demonstrate 
that what it was doing was achieving outcomes in society, other charities would have been 
able to copy it. He added that for this reason the charity sector in general needed to get 
better at measuring outcomes, so that models of delivery could be scaled up.12
7. We were also concerned that not only did the government repeatedly give money 
to Kids Company, but the amount of money kept going up, even though there were 
warning signs about the charity.13 Kids Company received around £4 million a year 
from government, significantly more than other charities which operate across the whole 
country. In 2011 Kids Company received a grant of £9 million over 2 years from the 
Department for Education, while national charities received far less; the second largest 
grant recipient from that round of funding was Barnardo’s, which received £4.2 million 
to cover the same period.14 The Department told us that it gives some £200 million a year 
to the voluntary sector and that Kids Company was receiving about 2% of this wider pot 
of money.15 
8. From 2013, Kids Company no longer had to compete for government funding.16 It 
had also received emergency one-off direct funding from the government in 2002 and 
2003.17 The Department for Education told us that it was not unusual for the Department 
to fund a charity directly on a non-competitive basis.18 It added that it funded a number 
of organisations in this way, including The Family Fund Trust which receives about £27 
million a year, and ChildLine which receives £2 million a year.19 
9. In 2011 the Department for Work & Pensions and the Department for Education 
seconded staff into Kids Company to oversee and help with not only their fundraising, but 
their corporate capacity. We asked what the Department for Education had learnt from 
these secondments. The Department told us that in its case a junior civil servant was sent 
there to help the charity develop alternative sources of income from the public sector, such 
as from local government. But that was completely unsuccessful.20
10. In addition, Kids Company’s accounts for 2003 report that HM Revenue & Customs 
wrote off its tax debts of £590,000. A review of Kids Company in 2014 by PKF Littlejohn, 
 9 Qq 125-127
10 Q 72
11 Q 73
12 Qq 31-32
13 Qq 2, 4
14 C&AG’s Report, para 3.15, Figure 6
15 Q 5
16 Q 19,  C&AG’s Report,  Figure 3
17 C&AG’s Report, para 2.7
18 Q 14
19 Q 16: Evidence letter from DfE 5 November 2015
20 Qq 81-82
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commissioned by the Cabinet Office and using information disclosed by Kids Company, 
highlighted that Kids Company had an arrangement in place with HMRC to pay off 
historical debts, but the amount of debt is unknown.21
11. In April 2015, the Cabinet Office paid £4.3 million to Kids Company in one lump 
sum, rather than £1 million a quarter as had previously been the case. It did this following 
what it describes as due diligence by its Finance Director, which concluded that the charity 
was unlikely to survive without such an advance payment.22 Although the charity did not 
produce plans to reduce costs at that time the Cabinet Office paid the grant in full because 
it considered the charity showed a “willingness to make plans” to reduce costs, including 
potentially withdrawing from Bristol.23 Of the £4.3 million, £1.5 million was intended to 
support the restructuring and downsizing the charity and the remainder was intended to 
go towards funding its charitable work.24 
12. We questioned the wisdom of agreeing to give Kids Company £4.3 million in one 
go, with its known cash flow problems, and expecting it not to just come back in a couple 
of months saying it needed more funding for the next quarter. The then Accounting 
Officer for the Cabinet Office replied “… indeed two months later that is what happened, 
so it now looks a naïve thing for me to have done”. 25 By way of context for his decision, 
the then Accounting Officer stressed the work done by the Cabinet Office at the time to 
reassure itself that, if it paid the entire sum up front it “could get out of this a sustainable 
organisation that would be free of government funding”.26 He had considered seeking a 
ministerial direction on whether to pay the £4.3 million as one lump sum but “considered 
on balance that the degree of heavyweight support and expertise we were talking to led us 
to believe that there was a reasonable prospect that we could turn this charity around … 
and that the charity that would emerge would be fitter”.27 However, the then Accounting 
Officer also told us that “In one respect, the numbers that we had about the current 
financial position of the charity when we made the decision were worse, it turned out, 
than we had thought … I do not think we were deliberately misled, but nevertheless we 
were disappointed to find that the numbers on which we had based the £4.2(sic) million 
grant were not quite as they appeared at the time they made the grant”.28 
13. He then described how he was “startled, shocked, and surprised” when, just 
six weeks after being paid the £4.3 million, Kids Company came back to seek more 
emergency funding. “It was astonishing that the charity had apparently spent our money 
and was already requiring more emergency funding from government”. As the charity 
had not met some of the conditions of the £4.3 million grant, the Cabinet Office’s initial 
reaction to the request for a further £3 million was “No, out of the question”. But then 
Kids Company returned again with a more specific and radical restructuring plan. The 
Cabinet Office still believed that too much was required for this plan to succeed and that 
the probability of successful restructuring was not high enough to justify public funding. 
The then Accounting Officer told us that he could therefore not sign up to the proposed 
restructuring, nor could he advise ministers to do so. However, he said that ministers 
21 C&AG’s Report, para 2.9
22 Evidence letter from Cabinet Office 5 November 2015
23 Qq 41-42
24 Q 97
25 Q 39
26 Q 38
27 Q 97
28 Q 110
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“quite reasonably took the view that it was a punt that was worth funding. It was a prospect, 
even if it was a narrow prospect, that was worth giving one last chance to the charity”. 29 
On 29 June 2015 the Cabinet Office received ministerial direction to pay £3 million grant 
to Kids Company. On 30 July Kids Company signed the grant agreement and the Cabinet 
Office paid the grant. On 5 August Kids Company closed and on 12 August it filed for 
insolvency.30
29 Q 55
30 C&AG’s Report,  Figure 2
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2 Government’s monitoring of Kids 
Company
14. The government relied heavily on Kids Company’s self-assessment of its performance.31 
These assessments reported Kids Company far exceeding performance targets set out 
in grant conditions. For example, Kids Company reported that against a target of 1,347 
interventions in 2013–14, they had delivered 30,217.32 The Department later claimed that 
the target of 1,347 was for intensive interventions only and that the grant agreement it had 
signed with Kids Company for the 2013–14 to 2014–15 cross-government grant had set 
out 35,245 specific funded interventions in total.33 
15. To us this suggested that the metrics that Kids Company were reporting were so over-
exceeded by the charity that there was clearly something wrong with the reporting and 
measurement framework. The Department for Education said that “I would say it shows a 
charity achieving more than we had set out”; it still did not seem to consider such dubious 
performance management information to be a matter that should have begged questions.34 
16. The Department for Education assured us that, until recently, very few people had 
doubted the quality of Kids Company’s achievements.35 The Department had taken the 
view that the outcomes it was getting for some highly innovative work with extremely 
vulnerable people did provide value for money.36 It gave an example of how it had monitored 
the Kids Company grant under the Youth Sector Development Fund. The Department’s 
overall evaluation of the Fund had concluded that the grant was helping Kids Company 
to become a centre of excellence, and enabling them to disseminate informed educational 
packages for service users and providers.37 However, we questioned whether this was in 
fact the case given that Kids Company never operated outside London and Bristol.38
17. Before 2013–14 Kids Company had been monitored in the same way as other 
organisations funded through the Department for Education’s grant programmes. The 
government took a different approach to monitoring Kids Company for its 2013-14 and 
2014-15 grants as these were direct awards to the charity.39 As a start the Department for 
Education awarded a £200,000 contract to Methods Consulting, operating from July 2013 
until March 2015, to monitor and evaluate the grant funding to Kids Company.40 When 
the Cabinet Office took over responsibility for the grant to Kids Company in July 2013, it 
also took over responsibility for monitoring the charity’s performance. It told us that one 
of its key concerns when taking over responsibility had been that the charity was not good 
at, or interested in, measuring its outcomes and the impact it was having in society.41 So 
the first thing it did was to work with Methods Consulting, because it wanted to improve 
31 C&AG’s Report,  Summary para 9
32 C&AG’s Report,  para 4.11, Figure 8 (The Cabinet Office subsequently revised the figures previously agreed with the 
National Audit Office Evidence letter from Cabinet Office 5 November 2015 (Cabinet Office)
33 Evidence letter from Cabinet Office 5 November 2015
34 Qq 7, 30
35 Q 26
36 Q 22
37 Q 27
38 Qq 28, 75
39 Qq 45, 46
40 C&AG’s Report,  para 4.9
41 Qq 2, 32
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the measurement of Kids Company’s outcomes.42 The then Accounting Officer of the 
Cabinet Office told us that he considered they had got some way towards that.43
18. The Department for Education told us that in 2009 an external review found that 
Kids Company was basically a well governed organisation. The Department conceded 
that it may have relied too heavily on that advice, and that advice may have been wrong, 
but the evidence it had at that time suggested Kids Company was a ‘financially reasonable’ 
organisation. Equally, when the Cabinet Office sent in accountants PKF Littlejohn in 2014 
to do a full study of Kids Company, its then Accounting Officer told us that what they 
found matched what the Department had found before: it was not an organisation that 
was badly governed or lacked financial control. However, PKF Littlejohn did highlight 
Kids Company’s “precarious cash flow situation”. Throughout Cabinet Office’s relationship 
with Kids Company the main worry had been its lack of reserves and the risk of it going 
bust at any time, which had led to its constant demand for Government back-up funding 
– “Looking back, one observation you could make is that we became obsessed about that 
point”.44 
19. The Department for Education admitted the charity’s financial position should 
have been examined more closely before 2013, as there had been warnings about the 
charity’s financial management.45 As long ago as 2005, a senior manager at the charity 
had highlighted concerns to the Department, and to the charity’s trustees, about Kids 
Company’s senior management structure and governance and about some individuals 
receiving cash payments from the charity. The Department hoped that such a warning 
would be better dealt with now.46 
42 Q 30
43 Q 101
44 Qq 49, 100
45 Q 49
46 Q 3; C&AG’s Report,  para 3.7
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3 Government’s relationship with Kids 
Company
20. The 2006 Charities Act provides Ministers with broad powers to fund charities, 
and the 2002 Education Act provides extensive grant-making powers similar to those 
in the Charities Act. The Accounting Officers stressed to us that it was entirely proper 
for Ministers to decide which charities in which sectors they wished to support, and 
that the decisions taken by Ministers had been ones that they were allowed to take.47 The 
Accounting Officers made it clear that the job of officials was to ensure that any support 
ministers wished to give any charity, including to Kids Company, was in line with the 
requirements of HM Treasury’s manual Managing Public Money and, once the decision 
to fund a charity had been made, that it was properly implemented in a way that delivered 
value for the taxpayer.48 
21. The Department for Education told us that up to 2013, as Kids Company had won 
funding on a competitive basis and delivered the outputs required, the question of seeking 
a ministerial direction had not arisen. When the charity failed to win funding through 
a competitive process in 2013, the Department prepared a “public interest case” for 
ministers to decide whether to fund Kids Company via a direct government grant rather 
than through competition, but this case did not include an assessment of value for money.49 
22. For the years 2013-14 and 2014-15, Kids Company received an annual non-competed 
grant which was funded by a number of Departments – the Departments for Education; 
Work & Pensions; Communities and Local Government; and Health. The Department for 
Education told us that the direct grant was made using powers under the 2002 Education 
Act and that the nature of this grant was different from the later one made by the Cabinet 
Office in 2015 under the 2006 Charities Act. The Department’s Accounting Officer also 
told us that he had not considered a direction in 2013, because he had assured himself that 
there was a public interest in the proposal that was being taken forward and ministers had 
agreed.50
23. Kids Company lobbied government for funding over many years, and we were told 
that it was a matter of public record that there were a number of letters to successive 
Prime Ministers.51 The NAO found a consistent pattern of behaviour since 2002, each time 
Kids Company approached the end of a grant term: lobbying of ministers and the media 
about the impact of service closures and redundancies when officials resisted funding 
applications; ministerial interventions to seek reviews of funding options, and eventually 
grants being awarded.52
24. Accounting Officers told us that they were under no pressure from ministers to make 
grants to Kids Company. In relation to giving the £4.3 million grant in one lumps sum in 
April 2015, on which he had considered but decided against seeking ministerial direction, 
the then Cabinet Office Accounting Officer told us “I certainly came under no political 
pressure to either give or not give a direction”. He said he was aware that Kids Company 
47 Qq 1, 30, 91, 96
48 Q 1
49 Qq 8, 1, 90; C&AG’s Report,  para 4.3
50 Qq 11, 90, 96; C&AG’s Report, Figure 7
51 Q 105
52 C&AG’s Report,  paras 3, 3.3
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was a prime ministerial favoured charity and that many ministers across government 
favoured it too, but still would have sought a direction if he had decided it was the right 
thing to do.53 When asked whether at any point Ministers had put pressure on them to 
agree funding to Kids Company the then Cabinet Office Accounting Officer said “None of 
my Ministers at the time put personal pressure on me … I was under no personal pressure 
to do one thing or another”. The Department for Education Accounting Officer said “No, 
I was not put under any pressure”.54
25. As the replication of its services was a condition of Kids Company’s funding between 
2005 and 2014, we could not understand why it got no further than operating outside 
Bristol and London and why, after 13 years and £42 million, the government continued 
experimenting with the charity.55 The Department for Education explained that replication 
included the spreading-out of the charity itself and the development of techniques that 
could be picked up by other people. It added that most people had seen Kids Company as 
something that was developing innovative practice that was not being developed elsewhere 
and that the Department had been involved in sharing this practice.56
26. We were also concerned that children elsewhere in the country had just as important 
or difficult needs as in London. The Cabinet Office’s then Accounting Officer responded 
that if there had been a charity in, for example, Sunderland with the same compelling 
methodology and the same appeal to politicians, then perhaps it would have succeeded. 57 
He also told us that if Kids Company had been able to demonstrate that what it was doing 
was achieving outcomes in society, other charities would have been able to copy it.58
27. Many government departments had a relationship with Kids Company. The 
charity first received central government funding from the Home Office in 2002.59 The 
Department for Education was responsible for the charity’s funding for many years and 
this responsibility was transferred to the Cabinet Office in July 2013.60 We were also told 
that the charity made approaches to different departments for funding. For example, 
when seeking its final funding of £3 million in June 2015 it had initially approached the 
Department for Work & Pensions for the money.61 But we were concerned about how well 
much information on Kids Company had been shared across Whitehall. For example, we 
would have expected the Department for Education to have told colleagues at the Cabinet 
Office that Kids Company had no reserves, when it passed over responsibility for the 
charity. The Cabinet Office would not then have had to rely on a report from accountants.62 
28. While government gave £42 million to Kids Company, local authorities spent just 
£2 million with the charity over the period.63 We were concerned that Kids Company, 
beyond a couple of boroughs in south London, had not extended its reach into other local 
authority areas over the years.64 We were also disappointed to hear that departments had 
53 Qq 97, 98
54 Qq 116, 117
55 Qq 75, 79
56 Qq 75, 76
57 Q 74
58 Q 31
59 Q 102; C&AG’s Report, Summary para 2, Figure 2
60 Q 1, 2; C&AG’s Report, para 4.13
61 Q 55
62 Q 51
63 C&AG’s Report,  paras 2.5, 2.10, Figure 3 
64 Q 79
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not formally spoken to local authorities to find out how Kids Company was operating 
on the ground and why local authorities had found it difficult to fund the charity. The 
Cabinet Office had only had informal conversations with local authorities in Lambeth 
and Southwark about why local authorities found it difficult to fund Kids Company.65 But 
Bristol Council, for example, had terminated a contract with Kids Company as it had 
failed to achieve registered provider status.66 The Cabinet Office’s then Accounting Officer 
accepted that departments would have benefited from seeking out more information from 
local authorities.67
65 Q 61
66 C&AG’s Report,  para 2, 10 (footnote 12) 
67 Q 62
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4 What the Government has learned
29. We asked the Accounting Officers what they had learned from the Kids Company 
experience. The Department for Education told us it had four key learning points: there 
had been too much one-off decision-making as opposed to looking at the entire story; the 
need to look at getting the balance right between self-reporting and external evaluation; 
on impact, to be able to answer questions about both outputs and outcomes - most of the 
Department’s monitoring had been of outputs, it is more difficult to measure outcomes 
but the Department needed to improve in future; and to improve record-keeping. The 
Department also said it would be addressing the wider question of how it works with the 
voluntary sector and how grants work.68 The then Accounting Officer for the Cabinet 
Office agreed with the Department’s learning points and also said that “evidence first, 
decision second is better than the other way round”.69
30. The Cabinet Office’s then Accounting Officer commented that use of the Charities 
Act to step in and provide front-line services is unusual and should be treated with caution 
and “I think we should be less willing to use our general powers under the Charities Act 
to make uncompleted grants”.70 He also commented, on learning points, that he would be 
cautious about making funding commitments that involve more than one department, 
which can lead to people letting their guard down, and about charities that make multiple 
approaches to government, which can be hard to control. He also advised care over grants 
to charities which are funded by whip-rounds across departments, as people pay less 
attention when contributing small amounts to a larger overall figure.71 The Department 
said that, when dealing with grant applications, it tended to look at the grant in question, 
rather than wider questions about the organisation, and this was also a learning point.72 
31. We asked the then Accounting Officer whether, if Kids Company had not gone 
insolvent just after receiving its last £3 million, he thought the Cabinet Office would still 
be funding them. He commented that the model for funding would be a charity that 
was solvent, at arm’s length from government, and sustainable without hand-to-mouth 
government funding. “I think the model we are hoping for is that it would not be funded 
by government today, unless through a competitive process”.73
68 Qq 28, 120, 121
69 Q 121
70 Qq 62, 68
71 Qq 68, 121
72 Q 51
73 Q 83
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Formal Minutes
Monday 9 November 2015
Members present:
Meg Hillier, in the Chair
Mr Richard Bacon
Caroline Flint
Nigel Mills
David Mowat
Stephen Phillips
Bridget Phillipson
Mrs Anne-Marie Trevelyan
Draft Report (The Government’s funding of Kids Company), proposed by the Chair, brought 
up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 31 read and agreed to.
Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.
Summary agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Eighth Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the 
provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
[Adjourned till Monday 16 November at 3.30 pm
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Witnesses
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the Committee’s 
inquiry web page.
Monday 2 November 2015 Question number
Richard Heaton, former Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office (now Ministry 
of Justice), and Chris Wormald, Permanent Secretary, Department for 
Education Q1-127
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Published written evidence
The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the Committee’s 
inquiry web page at www.parliament.uk/pac. KCP numbers are generated by the evidence 
processing system and so may not be complete.
1 Department for Education (KCP0002)
2 Mr Richard Heaton (KCP0003)
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